Gender Disintegration: Performance, Context and the Body by Posteraro, Tano
1 GENDER D IS INTEGRAT ION :PERFORMANCE , CONTEXT AND THEBODY
Tano Posteraro,1 McMaster University
In her Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir writes that “one is not
born, but rather becomes, a woman” (1989: 267). With these
words, de Beauvoir famously distinguished sex from gender. One
may be born with a particular biological makeup, but it is social-
isation that forms and regulates identity. In the following para-
graphs, I will first explore the theory by which gender emerges as
a social production, before considering how such an understand-
ing leads to the problem of gender disintegration. I will then
entertain Linda Alcoff’s hermeneutics as a response to this prob-
lematic. By understanding perception to be shaped by the body,
relative to context, I will conclude that Alcoff’s hermeneutics is
able to resolve the problem of gender disintegration.
Gender performativity is a concept attributed to contemporary
philosopher Judith Butler, who defines gender as the effect, rather
than the cause, of our actions and performances (1990: preface
xv). For Butler, the female gender is the result of habitual ac-
tion that produces the appearance of an anterior femininity. The
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performance that is itself responsible for the creation of gender
is apprehended, instead, as its effect. Consider the observations
of ethnomethodologist Harold Garfinkel. Garfinkel seeks to sus-
pend indefinitely the belief in the reality of “normal women”, and
consider instead how individuals produce that reality for others
(1967: 122).2 In other words, he suspends sex as a given, focusing
instead on how genders are produced. With Butler’s performa-
tive theory in mind, Garfinkel turns to Agnes, the female-bodied,
penis-endowed nineteen year-old who identifies as a woman. Be-
cause of her penis, Agnes must consciously present herself in a
way that ensures no one will question the reality of her female-
hood. We learn that Agnes produces the reality of her gender
for those around her by considering how to act in any given
social context: which interests to take up, in which fashion to
speak, how to behave, walk, sit, eat, converse, and so on. In con-
sciously deliberating her actions, Agnes is, Garfinkel concludes,
performing her gender (1967: 119). Through this performance,
she constructs the reality of her femininity for those around her.
Performative theory maintains that there is no objective female
gender. Rather, the female gender emerges out of a performance
of particular actions. Agnes seems to perform these actions as if
reading them from a script.
For performative theory, gender is the effect of the actions of an
un-gendered subject. But, not all of a subject’s actions may help
constitute her gender. If we consider the endless multiplicity of
a given subject’s performances, (the way a person acts at work
may differ from the way she acts at home or school) coupled
with the observation that while some actions may constitute the
production of one’s gender, others may figure in the production
of different identities entirely. We find ourselves in the midst
of the problem of gender disintegration. In short: to say that
gender has disintegrated is to say that it no longer retains any
significance. Gender is one identity-constituting factor among
several; as such, its significance is either wholly illusory or too
difficult to separate out from other factors to remain meaningful.
For example: is Agnes’s love for cookbooks part of her gender
performance or does it arise out of the multiple other identities
2 A gesture borrowed from Husserlian phenomenology: to properly investigate the
contents of consciousness, Husserl first bracketed belief in the external world.
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she may assume at a given time? At work, Agnes might like to
converse about politics. Is she doing so because of an academic
interest in political science, a capitalistic interest in economics, or
a friendly inclination to engage others in compelling debate? It
becomes increasingly difficult to apprehend and classify perfor-
mance when we consider the intersection of gender (performa-
tivity) with other identity-constituting factors such as race, class,
and upbringing. If all that stands between men and women is
habitual action in accordance with a gender that exists only as an
effect of those actions themselves, and the significance of any par-
ticular set of actions is not easily recognisable, then, what kind
of foundation can feminism claim for itself? Gender must, there-
fore, be regrounded in the subject prior to performance if it is
to retain its significance for feminism. Let us now turn to Linda
Alcoff and her conception of a bodily hermeneutic.
Alcoff’s understanding of hermeneutics picks up on Gadamer’s
concept of understanding through horizons, a theory in which a
person’s horizons are constituted by her or his culture, history,
upbringing and social role (1975: 301). Alcoff defines a person’s
horizons as “the framing assumptions we bring with us to percep-
tion and understanding, the congealed experiences that become
premises by which we strive to make sense of the world” (2006:
95). We develop these “framing assumptions” through socialisa-
tion, picking up on the language and presuppositions of those
who socialise us. It is through this socialisation that we form our
horizons, and thereby our horizonal understanding of the world
around us. To better understand how a person’s horizons affect
their perceptions and understanding, Alcoff offers the examples
of a queen and her servant (2006: 96). The queen, upon looking
into her castle’s dining area, sees a long elegant table suitable
for entertaining many guests and accommodating many feasts.
Her servant, however, looks upon the same table and sees only
a nightmare to clean, an offensively large receptacle for dirt and
dust. The queen and the servant interpret the same object (the
same dining table) differently; they perceive and understand it
through different horizons, framed by different assumptions.
Their antithetical perceptions, claims Alcoff, are constituted
by the way they were socialised. Raised in royalty, the Queen
knows only of feasts and parties, whereas the servant, raised in
poverty, knows only of housework and practicality. Thus, their
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differing horizons lead them to differing perceptions, a concept
which Gadamer proposes serves to highlight the difference in un-
derstanding between individuals.
To this traditional hermeneutical understanding, which limits a
person’s horizons to their culture, history, upbringing and social
roles, Alcoff adds the body as a horizonal constituting agent and
concept (2006: 102). It is through the addition of the body that
I posit Alcoff as a response to Butler. If gender emerges out of
social performance, and Gadamer’s hermeneutics posit the con-
stitution of horizons by strictly social means, then taken apart
from socialisation, gender is still rendered meaningless. What
we need, then, is a more fundamental understanding of gender
if we are to keep it from collapsing in its intersection with other
horizonal-constituting agents (e.g., race, class, upbringing, etc.).
In bringing the body to hermeneutics, Alcoff gives us exactly this:
a primordial conception of gender (that is, one that thinks gen-
der anterior to socialisation). For Alcoff, the way we move and
function, bodily speaking, helps constitute our horizonal inter-
pretation of the world around us. We apply terms derived from
bodily experience to the things we encounter. For example, we
say that the stocks are falling, like a body through space, when
they are fundamentally only decreasing incrementally in number
or percentage. Contrarily, when they are rising in value, we speak
as if they have physically jumped. We are not merely neutral sub-
jects faced with a social world, but rather embodied subjects; thus,
“bodily experiences establish horizons just as traditions and cul-
tures do” (2006: 102).
Of course, bodily experiences include concepts more complex
than merely jumping or falling. The female body includes the ex-
perience of lactation and pregnancy, whereas the male body does
not. Consequently, Alcoff believes these inherent differences re-
flect a “perceptual orientation and a conceptual mapping that
determines value, relevance, and imaginable possibilities”(2006:
107). Just as the servant and Queen, possessing different hori-
zons, are unable to perceive the same dining table, a girl learn-
ing of her ability to bear children will be able to imagine differ-
ent possibilities, dangers and threats than a boy learning he will
never have to. Our very embodiment, then, helps constitute the
horizons we use to understand the world: nursing, childbirth and
rape form the horizons of a female as a direct result of her body.
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It is in here where we can locate gender. However, Alcoff does
not deny that gender intersects with other identity-constituting
factors such as race, and class. So, she allows that the gender of
different women may constitute their horizons in different ways,
just as one woman may interpret the possibility of childbearing as
the highest calling of the human condition, whereas another may
interpret it as an oppressive agent serving only to trap women
in imminent existence.3 Nonetheless, Alcoff insists that the pos-
sibility itself has a bearing on a woman’s horizons, even given
its intersection with other factors. Indeed, thought in this way,
horizons are gendered and therefore able to provide a basis for
solidarity among women.
To understand horizons better, Gadamer proposes that we can
look more closely at our reading of the texts that orient our hori-
zonal understandings (1975: 294). The constitution of one’s hori-
zons is a circular process: our understanding of who we are de-
pends on the contexts in which we live and act, and, our un-
derstanding of how we live and act in those contexts depends,
in turn, upon our understanding of who we are. Yet, we live
and act in many contexts: in a family, as part of a society, in a
career, for a cause, and so on. Thus, we can tell different sto-
ries of who we are depending on which context we choose to
speak from. Gender, as a way of understanding who we are, is
bound to context; it is never acontextual. This is the fundamental
contribution of Alcoffian hermeneutics to the problem of gender
disintegration. The way we understand gender is inextricable
from the context through which we choose to view it. Therefore,
there can be no gender as such; no objective womanhood or fem-
ininity. But, given the context of traditional familial roles, we
can point to a more definite understanding of the significance of
one’s gender.For example, there are certain roles fulfilled by a sister
in a traditional Christian household, by virtue of her being female (that
is, a sister). Given the context of walking alone, late at night, a
subject’s body constitutes the way they construct the experience.
That is, a woman with a vagina is more likely to fear sexual as-
sault, and will therefore, meet the walk home with anxiety (her
body determines her social experience). Therefore, context be-
3 Simone de Beauvoir theorised that traditional female gender roles such as house-
work and child-raising doomed women to an existence devoid of transcendence,
and therefore, freedom: imminence.
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comes a lens through which we can approach gender, and as
contexts change, (as lenses are replaced) gender begins to change
and appear differently. Likewise, just as with a camera without a
lens, there is no picture, so without a context, there is no gender.
Further, the aforemantioned is complicated by the fact that con-
text itself is also subject to interpretation. Our understanding of
a female as a woman, then, will depend upon our understanding
of the context in which femalehood is a part. Given the context
of sexual reproduction, for example, the way we understand a
female in terms of her sexual reproductive capacity is dependent
on how we understand sexual reproduction itself. For Judith But-
ler, sexual reproduction is a “compulsory heterosexuality”.4 A fe-
male is a female in terms of sexual reproduction, insofar as she is
capable of contributing an egg, and incubating a fetus. Moreover,
as was outlined above, textual understanding is a circular affair,
and so, if we can know a female as a child-bearer in terms of sex-
ual reproduction, we can only know sexual reproduction in terms
of its parts; namely: the female child-bearer and the male sperm-
provider. Thus, just as the child-bearer is inextricable from the
reproductive context, so the reproductive context is inextricable
from the child-bearer. In short, sex becomes meaningless outside
of such a relation. So, not only is such a gender-understanding
derived from sex, but such a sex-understanding is, too, derived
from gender. Consequently, taken apart from context, gender
disintegrates.
Does this mean we have come full circle, have we undermined
our own enterprise, refuted our own position? No, for we have
brought the term context to the formula of disintegration. That
gender becomes meaningless outside of context need not be neg-
ative. Consider the notion that apart from context, everything
disintegrates; or more properly, that we can only come to know
anything relative to its respective context. If this proposition can
be coherently entertained, then gender becomes just as stable as
anything else. This is not as radical as it sounds, and is not with-
out its benefits. In terms of a medical context, we should consider
people as patients and not as females or males, just as we would
think it absurd to consider them either as cell-phone enthusiasts
4 This means to think in terms of those body parts significant in the act of sexual
reproduction.
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or techno-luddites when ordering an organ-donor list.5 Further,
the introduction of context to gender relieves feminism of its ten-
dency to homogenise women as inherently oppressed: as victims,
not of history, but of nature itself.6 By contextualising gender, we
can do away with such essentialism, for even the most staunchly
radical feminist will grant that in the context of finding work as a
baby-sitter, women are not inhibited by their oppression, they are
not oppressed at all. This crucial insight allows us to consolidate
and refocus the feminist project. By addressing the particular
contexts within which female oppression operates, we can begin
to work more productively and effectively as feminists.
In short, if Alcoffian hermeneutics is to curb the threat of gen-
der disintegration, we must hold that context grounds meaning.7
This is to say that gender means different things in different con-
texts; apart from context, it means nothing at all. Thus, to give
meaning to gender, we must first situate it. Far from demolishing
gender, we have instead only contextualised it. Or perhaps it was
a contextual notion to begin with. Perhaps performative theory
only plucked gender from context, thereby emptying it of its sig-
nificance. By reading Alcoff against Butler, perhaps we have only
returned gender to its original home, granted it back its original
meaning. Perhaps there truly is “nothing outside the text” (1976:
158-9).8
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